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LIST OF PARTIES IN THE COURT BELOW
The following is a complete list of the parties in the
proceedings before the Third Judicial District Court:

JUDGE
The HON. FRANK G. NOEL, Judge Presiding, Third Judicial
District, Salt Lake Department.

PARTIES
1. ERICH ROSS DIENER, respondent, represented by Utah Legal
Clinic, Brian M. Barnard, and James L. Harris, Jr., Attorneys at
Law.
2. TIFFANY JACOBS DIENER, petitioner, represented by John
W. Call, of Nygaard, Coke & Vincent, L.C.

PRIOR OR RELATED APPEALS
There are no prior or related appeals.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

TIFFANY JACOBS DINNER,
:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

:

20030330-CA

Petitioner/Appellee,
vs.
ERICH ROSS DINNER,
Respondent/Appellant.

AN APPEAL FROM FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
ORDER (3/25/2003), BY THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT,
The Hon. Frank G. Noel, Judge, presiding.
(Trial Court Case No. 98-490-1948 DA)

Respondent/Appellant, Erich Diener, by and through counsel,
submits the following brief:

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (h) (1953 as amended) .

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1)

Whether the evidence presented at the 2003 trial on

Erich Diener's petition to modify supports the trial court's
findings that the parties entered into an "agreement" at the time

of the 1998 divorce regarding child support.

Whether the

evidence presented at trial supports the trial court's findings
that there was a bargained-for exchange regarding child support
at the time of divorce.

If so, what are the terms of this

agreement?
2)

Whether the trial court's factual findings support the

conclusions of law denying Erich Diener's request to adjust his
child support obligation.
3)

Whether the trial court erred in refusing to apply Utah

Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2(6) (1953 as amended) and the right to a
recalculation of child support after three (3) years passage from
the date of a decree regardless of any change in circumstances of
the parties.
4)

Whether the trial court erred in finding "no substantial

change in circumstances upon which to justify modification of the
child support" under Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2(7) (1953 as
amended).
5)

Whether the trial court erred in its narrow application

of Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2(7) (1953 as amended) solely to Mr.
Diener's financial circumstances and not to the overall change in
both parties' circumstances.
6)

Did the trial court misconstrue Mr. Diener's stipulation

regarding amounts to be used for the child support calculation?

2

7)

Is it ever in the child's best interest to reduce child

support?

ISSUES RAISED AND CONSIDERED
The foregoing issues were raised in Mr. Diener's Petition to
Modify Decree (R. 43), Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 62), Trial
Memorandum (R. 153), at trial (Transcript), Defendant's
Additional Requested Findings of Fact and Objections (R. 167) and
Defendant's Objections to Plaintiff's Findings of Fact (R. 184).
The issues were considered and ruled upon by the court in
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order1 (R. 202).

STANDARD OF REVIEW
1)

The trial court's findings of fact in a divorce action

are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard.

Kessimakis v.

Kessimakis, 977 P.2d 1226, 1228 (Utah Ct. App. 1999).

The trial

court, however, must have made adequately detailed findings on
each issue so that the Court of Appeals can determine if those
findings were rationally based upon applicable factors.
Williamson v. Williamson, 3 72 Utah Adv. Rep. 45, 4 6 (Utah Ct.
App. 1999) .
2)

The conclusions of law that flow from the findings are

reviewed for correctness and are given no special deference on
1

Defendant's objections were partially overruled in a
minute entry (R. 181) and in a hand written denial on the last
page of the 3/25/2003 Order (R. 209).
3

appeal.

Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 977 P.2d 1126, 1228 (Utah Ct.

App. 1999); Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438, 442 (Utah Ct. App.
1998).

Correctness "means the appellate court decides that

matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial
judge's determination of law."

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936

(Utah 1994) .

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1)

The parties were divorced in a stipulated decree entered

on April 17, 1998.
2)

Decree (R. 33).

There was one (1) child born during the marriage, Zoe-

Nicene Lois Diener, dob 2/19/1995.
3)

Decree, p. 2 (R. 34).

In the decree, Erich Diener was ordered to pay $4 00.00

per month for child support to petitioner/appellee Tiffany Diener
for the parties' one (1) child.
Utah Child Support Guidelines.
4)

Decree, p. 2 (R. 34).

Erich Diener filed a Petition to Modify the Divorce

Decree on December 4, 2001.
5)

The child support exceeded the

Petition to Modify (R. 43).

Erich Diener sought a reduction in child support, a

change in the requirements regarding life insurance, a
termination of the requirement for the parties to contribute to a
college fund for the child, and the right to claim the child for
alternate tax years.

Petition to Modify Decree, p. 2-4 (R. 44-

46) .

4

6)

More than three

(3) years had elapsed since the entry of

the decree at the time Mr. Diener filed his Petition to Modify.
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, dated 3/25/2003,
p. 2 (R. 2 0 3 ) .
7)

The Petitioner/Appellee Tiffany Diener moved the court

to dismiss
62).

(R. 5 0 ) . Mr. Diener moved for summary judgment (R.

Both motions were denied on our about April 1, 2002.

Denying Motion to Dismiss
8)

(R.

Order

90).

The matter came before the court for trial on February

6, 2003.
9)

Based upon that trial, the court issued an Order dated

March 25, 2003, entitled Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order, dated 3/25/2003

(hereinafter "3/25/2003

Order")(attached

hereto as Exhibit "B"; see also R. 2 0 2 ) .
10)

The court:

Denied Mr. Diener's Petition to Modify the child support.
3/25/2003 Order, p. 7 (R. 208).
Denied Mr. Diener's Petition to Modify the tax deduction as
to Mr. Diener's request to alternate tax years.2

3/25/2003

Order, p. 7 (R. 208).

2

The Court did order that Mr. Diener could purchase the
right to claim the child for tax purposes but declined to
establish a procedure to do so.
5

Granted the request to suspend the requirement that the
parties contribute to a college fund for the child.

3/25/2003

Order, p. 7 (R. 208).
Granted the request regarding the maintenance of life
insurance (each party is now only required to obtain such
insurance only if it is available through the parties' employers
at a reasonable cost).
11)

3/25/2003 Order, p. 7 (R. 208).

This timely appeal followed.

Notice of Appeal (R.

210) .

STATEMENT OF FACTS
I.

GENERAL FACTS:
1.

The parties were granted a divorce on April 17, 1998.

Decree of Divorce (hereinafter "Decree") (R. 33), Trial
Transcript, p. 4 (hereinafter "Transcript"; the transcript of the
2003 trial on Erich Diener's Petition to Modify is found in the
record on appeal beginning at R. 220) .
2.

One child was born during the marriage.

The child's

name and date of birth are:
Zoe-Nicene Lois Diener, February 19, 1995.
Petition for Dissolution of Marriage, p. 1 (R. 1 ) , Decree, p. 2
(R. 34).
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3.

The decree of divorce set child support "in the amount

of $400.00 per month . . . ."

Decree, p. 2 (R. 34)

exceeded the Utah Support Guidelines.

That amount

Decree, p. 2 (R. 34/ see

also Transcript, p. 17). The Decree and the Findings set out no
reason why the amount exceeds the Guidelines (R. 2 6 & 33).

II• FACTS RE: INCREASED CHILD SUPPORT AS A BARGAINED-FOREXCHANGE:
The Court in the 2003 modification proceeding made the
following finding:
The higher child support amount was a bargained-for
consideration where each of the parties made significant
concessions in reaching that agreement.
Ms. Diener
agreed not to pursue claims for alimony or additional
property settlement, based upon Mr. Diener's use of Ms.
Diener's pre-marital assets, and Mr. Diener agreed to pay
a higher monthly child support amount in order to be
relieved of the risk of such claims by Ms. Diener being
successful.
3/25/2003 Order, p. 2 (R. 203) .3

The court then concluded "it

would be inequitable to apply to provisions of § 78-45-7.2(6),
Utah Code, to reduce Mr. Diener's child support obligation,
inasmuch as doing so would provide Mr. Diener with the benefits
of the bargain without requiring its corresponding obligations."
3/25/2003 Order, p. 5 (R. 206).

3

Discussed more fully below, none of the additional
findings support this finding. Rather, the additional findings
support Mr. Diener's allegation that there has been a substantial
change to the parties' circumstances.
7

There was no finding in the original Findings of Fact in
1998 supporting the decree with regard to any such bargain (see
R. 2 6) .

There is no indication of any such bargain in the

parties' Stipulation and Settlement Agreement (see R. 10).
Finally, there is no indication of any such bargain in the
parties' Decree of Divorce (see R. 33).
A.
1.

TESTIMONY IN SUPPORT OF THE COURT'S FINDING
(MARSHALING REQUIREMENT):
Tiffany Diener was aware that the child support amount

ordered in the Decree was higher than the amount provided by the
Utah Child Support Guidelines.
2.

Transcript, p. 5.

Erich Diener testified, "I am aware that the divorce

decree required I pay $400.00 a month in child support."
Transcript, p. 17.

He testified, "At some time during the entire

proceedings I know I must have become aware of the fact that it
was more."
3.

Transcript, p. 38.

Erich consulted with a JAG attorney while stationed at

Fort Meade, Maryland in the Fall of 1997 regarding divorce.
Erich was not represented by counsel at the time of the divorce
decree or in the original proceeding.
4.

Transcript, p. 4 & 16.

Erich told Tiffany that he did not want her to pursue a

claim for alimony.

Transcript, p. 35.
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5.

There was approximately $110,000.00 in Tiffany's trust

account when she reached the age of majority in 1992, two (2)
years before the parties' marriage.
6.

Transcript, p. 35, 57.

Prior to the marriage, Tiffany bought Erich a used 1970

a Toyota Land Cruiser.

The value of the vehicle was

approximately $2,000.00 to $2,400.00.
57.

Transcript, p. 35, 51-52 &

The vehicle was purchased in 1993, whereas the parties were

married on July 2, 1994.
7.

Transcript, p. 62.

Before the parties' marriage, Tiffany paid a portion of

Erich's tuition while he attended Harvard University for one (1)
semester.
8.

Transcript, p. 36.
Erich attended Harvard University for one (1) semester

in 1992 right after high school.

Tiffany paid $5,000.00 toward

tuition and airfare on behalf of Erich.
9.

Transcript, p. 55-56.

Tiffany characterized the $5,000.00 as a loan that was

"an investment in him and our future together."
56 & 61.

She testified,

u

We had talked about marriage, and he

had said that he would make it up to me."
10.
gift.

Transcript, p.

Transcript, p. 56.

Tiffany testified that the 1970 Land Cruiser was not a

She testified that when the vehicle was sold, Erich gave

her half of the sales price, $1,200.00.
11.

Transcript, p. 56-57.

Tiffany testified that in early 1998 the parties spoke

extensively about the terms of the pending divorce.
9

Transcript,

p. 58.

Erich's testimony does not dispute this assertion.

Transcript, p. 34.
12.

Tiffany testified that Erich Diener brought up the

amount of $400.00 in child support.

Transcript, p. 58-59.

Erich's testimony does not dispute this assertion.
p. 34.

Transcript,

Responding to the proposed amount child support, Tiffany

testified, "I laughed.
owed me.

I said that's ridiculous with all that he

I said, 'If I still had my trust fund, I would - - I

could live off much more than that just from the interest.'"
Transcript, p. 59.
13.

Tiffany testified, "I discussed both alimony and

property claims.

[Erich Diener] wanted me not to pursue those in

exchange for a higher amount of child support."

Transcript, p.

59.
14.
action.

Tiffany did not make a claim for alimony in the divorce
Transcript, p. 38.4

4

The Stipulation and Settlement Agreement (R. 10)
specifically decline alimony: "This is a brief marriage of 3-1/2
years duration. The parties are able-bodied and able to provide
for their own support and neither shall pay alimony to the
other." Stipulation, p. 4 (R. 13). The original Findings of
Fact reads identical (R.*< 29) . Finally, the Decree of Divorce
declines alimony. Decree, p. 3 (R. 35).
10

15.
$400.00,

If Erich is permitted to reduce child support from
Tiffany will seek to assert claims for alimony and/or

property settlement.

Transcript, p. 60.

B.

THE FOLLOWING TESTIMONY/EVIDENCE DETRACTS FROM THE
COURT'S FINDING:

16.

Tiffany was represented by counsel at the time of the

divorce decree.

Transcript, p. 4 & 16.

Erich was not.

Transcript, p. 4 & 16.
17.

The marital debts listed in the Divorce Decree totaled

approximately $11,400.00.

Decree, p. 4 (R. 36). Of those,

Tiffany was ordered to pay $3,350.00.

Transcript, p. 9; Decree,

p. 4 (R. 36). Erich was ordered to pay the remaining balance.
Id.
18.

There is no mention or indication of pre-marital debts

(if indeed such existed) in the decree.

See Decree (R. 36);

Transcript, p. 9.
19.

There is no mention of any debts (if indeed such

existed), that Erich owed to Tiffany in the decree.

Transcript,

p. 9.
20.
account.
21.

Erich testified that he did not use Tiffany's trust
Transcript, p. 35.
Before the parties' marriage on July 2, 1994, Tiffany's

trust account was entirely depleted.
11

Transcript, p. 48, 5 7 & 63.

22.
gift.

Erich testified that the used 1970 Land Cruiser was a

Transcript, p. 49-50.

was purchased.
23.

He was not present when the vehicle

Transcript, p. 51-52.

Tiffany testified that Erich gave $1,200.00 to Tiffany

at the time he sold the vehicle.

Transcript, p. 57.

testified that he did not recall ("I don't know.
I gave her any . . . . " ) .
24.

Transcript, p. 52.

Transcript, p. 62.

There is no mention of the Land Cruiser or a related

debt in the decree.
26.

I don't know if

The used Land Cruiser was purchased prior to the

parties' marriage.
25.

Erich

Transcript, p. 62-63.

Erich had no discussions with Tiffany in negotiations

for settlement of the divorce regarding increased child support
in exchange for waiver of alimony.
27.

Transcript, p. 42-43.

Rather, Erich testified, "I . . . said not to worry too

much that she didn't have [the trust fund] anymore because . . .
at the time . . .

I wanted to be a doctor."

Transcript, p. 43.

These statements were made by Erich prior to and during the
marriage, not at the time of the divorce.
28.

Id.

The money that Tiffany paid to help Erich attend

Harvard for a semester was an "investment in [the parties']
future."

Transcript, p. 61.

12

29.
decree.
30.

There is no mention of the "Harvard" money in the
Transcript, p. 62.
The Stipulation and Settlement Agreement (R. 10),

original Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 26) and
Decree (R. 33) all implicitly deny alimony.

The Decree reads,

"The parties are able-bodied and able to provide for their own
support, and it is ordered that neither party pay alimony to the
other."

III.

Decree, p. 3 (R. 35).

FACTS RE: SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES:
A.

CHANGE IN ERICH DIENER'S CIRCUMSTANCES:

1.

At the time of the divorce Erich was in the military.

Transcript, p. 4-5, 16.

Throughout the marriage, Erich was in

the United States Army.

Transcript, p. 17.

2.

Erich's base monthly income at the time of the divorce

was $1,192.00.

Transcript, p. 17.

In addition, to the base

income, Erich received a housing allowance.

Transcript, p. 17.

With the housing allowance, Erich's income was approximately
$1,700.00 per month.

Transcript, p. 17-18.

Thus, the divorce

decree reflected income of $1,700.00 per month for Erich.
Transcript, p. 18.
3.

Erich was discharged from the military in April 1998.

Transcript, p. 9, 17-18.
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4.

From April until about June of 1998, Erich was employed

by Circuit City as a salesman earning $1,200.00 gross per month.
Transcript, p. 18.
5.

From June 1998 until September 2001, Erich was employed

by TEKsystems.
6.

When first employed, Erich earned $12.00 per hour for

TEKsystems.
annually.
7.

Transcript, p. 18-19.

When Erich was terminated, he was earning $55,000.00
Transcript, p. 19.

Erich's termination with TEKsystems in 2001 was the

result of a reduction in force.
8.

Transcript, p. 19.

Erich was unable to find employment in the same field.

Erich looked repeatedly for work in said field.

Erich did not

qualify for such employment in the constricted job market.

The

jobs for which Erich did apply, required a Bachelor's Degree.
Transcript, p, 19-21.
9.

Erich returned to college shortly after being laid off

from TEKsystems.
10.

Transcript, p. 21 & 28.

Erich was employed at Tucci's Italian Restaurant from

November 2001 to October/September 2002.
and waiter.
college.
11.

Erich was a bartender

He worked shifts that would enable him to attend

Transcript, p. 21-22.
Erich's average income at Tucci's was $10.00 per hour.

Erich worked approximately twenty to thirty (20-30) hours per
14

week at Tucci's.

Transcript, p. 22.

Erich terminated his

employment in September 2002 with Tucci's.
12.

Transcript, p. 22.

During 2002, Erich temporarily worked part-time again

for TEKsystems from May 2002 until about October 2002.

Erich was

paid $2 0.00 per hour for this limited work, for a total amount of
about $3,655.00 in 2002.
13.

After October 2002, TEKsystems did not offer Erich any

other employment.
14.

Transcript, p. 24.

Transcript, p. 24.

Erich has provided computer assistance to Brian

Barnard's law office, his counsel in this matter, in exchange for
attorney fees.

The total amount credited for 2001 and 2002 was

$1,200.00 and $1,912.50 respectively.
15.

Transcript, p. 25.

Erich enlisted in the National Guard in September 2002,

with an obligation of one (1) weekend a month and two (2) weeks
each summer.

Erich's compensation from the National Guard is

approximately $250.00 per month.
16.

Transcript, p. 26.

At the time of trial, Erich was employed part-time at

The Gateway Academy, a residential treatment center for teenage
boys.

Erich earns approximately $10.00 per hour and works about

24 hours a week on the graveyard shift.

Transcript, p. 2 6-27.

Erich does not have any fringe benefits available to him through
that employment.

Transcript, p. 27.
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17.

Erich is currently a full-time student at the

University of Utah working towards a Bachelor's Degree.
Transcript, p. 28.

His anticipated graduation is Spring of 2004.

Transcript, p. 29.
18.

While attending the University of Utah, Erich has

incurred student loans of about $13,000.00.

Transcript, p. 50.

Those student loans have been utilized by Erich to attend school,
pay bills, and to meet other current living expenses.
Transcript, p. 50.
B.
19.
nanny.
20.

CHANGE IN TIFFANY DIENER'S CIRCUMSTANCES:
At the time of the divorce, Tiffany was employed as a
Transcript, p. 5.
At the time of the divorce, Tiffany earned $1,192.00

per month.

Transcript, p. 6.

Tiffany also received at no cost

room and board for herself and the parties' daughter.
Transcript, p. 6.
21.

Tiffany is currently unemployed.

Transcript, p. 7.

She has been unemployed since quitting the above nanny job in
June of 2 001.
22.

Transcript, p. 7.

Tiffany is currently a full-time student at the

University of Utah.

Transcript, p. 7-8.
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23.

Tiffany does not have any disability or physical

impairment that would prevent her from working.

Transcript, p.

8-9.
24.

The parties' child is a normal, healthy child who

attends full time traditional school.

Transcript, p. 10.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The lower court erred in denying Erich Diener's petition to
modify the decree to adjust child support.

Erich Diener is

entitled to an adjustment of child support based upon the passage
of three (3) years and the non-temporary difference of 10%.
Those who owe child support are entitled to a review and an
adjustment once every three (3) years if there is a difference of
10% or more between the amount previously ordered and the
recalculated amount under the guidelines.

There is no

requirement of a substantial change in the parties circumstances
to effect this change.
The lower court erred in finding a bargained-for exchange of
alimony for increased child support.

The evidence presented, and

the original divorce documents, do not support such a finding.
There is no indication of said bargain in the original divorce
documents (Stipulation and Settlement Agreement (R. 10), Findings
of Fact (R. 29), and Decree of Divorce (R. 33)). The fact that
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there is no suggestion of such a bargain in the original divorce
documents is fatal to Tiffany Diener's current assertion that the
parties entered into a pre-divorce agreement.
The lower court erred in failing to find a substantial
change in the parties' circumstances.

Utah law allows an

adjustment to child support based upon a substantial change to
the parties circumstances.

If the court finds such a change, it

must determine whether the change results in a difference of 15%
or more between the amount of child support ordered and the
amount that would be required under the guidelines.

If there is

such a difference, the court shall adjust the amount of child
support to that which is provided for in the guidelines.
Erich Diener's situation has substantially changed.
Diener's situation has substantially changed.

Tiffany

In addition, the

trial court erred in solely examining Erich Diener's financial
circumstances, and not the overall change in both parties'
circumstances.
The best interests of the child can be met by a reduction of
child support.

Erich Diener is neither voluntarily unemployed,

nor voluntarily underemployed.

The trial court specifically

found that Mr. Diener requires a college degree to obtain gainful
employment at a reasonable rate of pay.
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Erich Diener's decision

to return to school will ultimately benefit the child by
providing greater earning capacity.
Finally, an injustice will be perpetrated if the trial
court's ruling is allowed to stand.

Assuming arguendo

that Erich

Diener indeed incurred an obligation to Tiffany Diener prior to
the marriage, at some point it will be repaid through the
increased support.

After repayment, Tiffany Diener will be

unjustly enriched by continued, excessive child support.

ARGUMENT
I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING ERICH DIENER'S REQUEST TO
MODIFY CHILD SUPPORT. ERICH DIENER IS ENTITLED TO AN ADJUSTMENT
IN CHILD SUPPORT PURSUANT TO UTAH LAW AFTER THE PASSAGE OF THREE
(3) YEARS:
Erich Diener is entitled to an adjustment of child support
based upon the passage of three (3) years and the non-temporary
difference of 10%.

Under Utah law, those who owe an obligation

of, or receive, child support are entitled to a review and an
adjustment once every three (3) years if there is a difference of
10% or more between the amount previously ordered and the
recalculated amount under the guidelines.

There is no

requirement of a substantial change in the parties' circumstances
to effect this change.

The pertinent statute reads as follows:
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(6) (a) If a child support order has not been issued or
modified within the previous three years, a parent, legal
guardian, or the office may petition the court to adjust
the amount of a child support order.
(b) Upon receiving a petition under Subsection (6) (a) ,
the court shall, taking into account the best interests
of the child, determine whether there is a difference
between the amount ordered and the amount that would be
required under the guidelines. If there is a difference
of 10% or more and the difference is not of a temporary
nature, the court shall adjust the amount to that which
is provided for in the guidelines.
(c) A showing of a substantial change in circumstances is
not necessary for an adjustment under Subsection (6) (b) .
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2

(6) (a)- (c) (1953 as amended).

The

statute mandates an adjustment to child support if the 10%
criteria is met:

"If there is a difference of 10% or more and

the difference is not of a temporary nature, the court shall
adjust the amount to that which is provided for in the
guidelines."

Id.

(emphasis added).

Thus, in light of the passage of three

(3) years from the

date the decree was entered herein, the court below erred by
refusing to recalculate child support pursuant to the guidelines
and order Erich Diener to pay the resulting amount.

II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING A BARGAINED-FOR EXCHANGE OF
ALIMONY FOR INCREASED CHILD SUPPORT.
The lower court found that
The higher child support amount was a bargained-for
consideration where each of the parties made significant
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concessions in reaching that agreement.
Ms. Diener
agreed not to pursue claims for alimony or additional
property settlement, based upon Mr. Diener's use of Ms.
Diener's pre-marital assets, and Mr. Diener agreed to pay
a higher monthly child support amount in order to be
relieved of the risk of such claims by Ms. Diener being
successful.
3/25/2003 Order, p. 2 (R. 203) .
The court concluded "it would be inequitable to apply to
provisions of § 78-45-7.2(6), Utah Code, to reduce Mr. Diener's
child support obligation, inasmuch as doing so would provide Mr.
Diener with the benefits of the bargain without requiring its
corresponding obligations."

3/25/2003 Order, p. 5 (R. 206).

The evidence presented, and the original divorce documents,
do not support such a finding.

There was no finding in the 1998

Findings of Fact with regard to any such bargain (see R. 2 6 ) .
There is no indication of any such bargain in the parties'
Stipulation and Settlement Agreement (see R. 10). Finally, there
is no indication of any such bargain in the parties' Decree of
Divorce (see R. 33). None of these documents mention this
"agreement."

Indeed, the Stipulation and Settlement Agreement

(R. 10) specifically denies alimony:
of 3-1/2 years duration.

"This is a brief marriage

The parties are able-bodied and able to

provide for their own support and neither shall pay alimony to
the other."

Stipulation, p. 4 (R. 13). The Findings of Fact

reads identical (R. 29). Finally, the Decree of Divorce
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specifically denies alimony.

Decree, p. 3 (R. 35)("The parties

are able-bodied and able to provide for their own support, and it
is ordered that neither party pay alimony to the other").
There was no basis for an award of alimony at the time of
the original decree.

Given the parties' ages, health, earning

abilities, and the duration of the marriage, an alimony award, if
made, would have been for a short period of time and in a very
modest amount.

Tiffany Diener's potential claim for alimony was

so slight as to be inconsequential.
In consideration of the Petition to Modify, the trial court
relied solely upon the ad hoc,

post divorce recollection of

Tiffany Diener to find the agreement.

The fact that there is no

suggestion of such a bargain in the Settlement Stipulation,
Findings of Fact, and the Decree of Divorce is fatal to Tiffany
Diener's ad hoc

assertion that the parties entered into a pre-

divorce agreement.

Instruction is found in the case Jones v.

Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985).
claimed, inter

alia,

certain property.

In that case, the appellant

that the trial court improperly distributed
In its review, the Utah Supreme Court noted

that findings of fact generally must include valuation of assets
in order to permit appellate review.

In the Jones case, however,

trial counsel for the party appealing "prepared . . . inadequate
findings of fact . . . conclusions of law and decree of divorce,
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all of which the court entered without alteration."

Id. at 1074.

The Supreme Court declined to upset the property distribution,
concluding appellant's claim had been waived because the party
seeking review/reversal failed to adequately prepare the findings
of fact, etc.

IcL at 1074-75.

By analogy, the same is true herein.

Tiffany Diener seeks

to establish and then enforce an "agreement" that was nowhere
delineated in the original Stipulation and Settlement Agreement
(R. 10),
33) .5

Findings of Fact (R. 26) and Decree of Divorce (R.

These documents were prepared by Tiffany Diener's trial

counsel.

Any questions as to construction, should be resloved

against Ms. Diener.

Any failures therein should be construed

against Ms. Diener.

By failing include any terms (if indeed they

ever existed) of the parties' alleged agreement, Ms. Diener
waived her right to assert such a claim.

The failure to include

such terms is fatal to Ms. Diener's current claim otherwise.6

5

Similarly, the original divorce papers contain no mention
of the 1970 Land Cruiser, the "Harvard" money, or any pre-marital
debts (if indeed any such existed).
6

The error is compounded by the recent judicial review.
Herein, the lower court fails to find and/or delineate any
specifics of the parties alleged agreement.
What are the terms of the increased support agreement
between the parties which supposedly formed the basis of the
original settlement stipulation and decree? Neither the original
decree nor the recent findings recite the terms of this
agreement. Did Erich agree to pay increased child support until
23

The trial court erred in finding a bargained-for exchange of
higher child support for alimony.

III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND A SUBSTANTIAL
CHANGE IN THE PARTIES' CIRCUMSTANCES:
The lower court made the following Conclusion of Law
Because the Defendant's financial circumstances have
not changed substantially, the Court finds that there is
no substantial change in circumstances upon which to
justify modification of the child support Order under §
78-45-7.2(7), Utah Code.
3/25/2003 Order, p. 6 (R. 207).

Such a conclusion does not flow

from the testimony presented at trial, nor does it flow from the
subsidiary findings made by the court.7

the child reaches the age of eighteen (18)? Did he agree to the
increase regardless of his ability to work? What if Erich became
physically disabled and unable to work? Did Tiffany agree that
child support would never increase beyond the $400.00 per month.
What if Erich began earning $100,000.00 per year? Is Tiffany
precluded from seeking increased child support? Would Erich be
required to pay child support beyond the guidelines based upon
his greatly increased income? The same excess amount? A
percentage increased amount?
These and similar questions which depend upon the terms of
the alleged agreement can not be answered. The agreement is
indefinite and amorphous and so lacking in terms to be
unenforceable.
7

The Utah Supreme Court, in Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996
(Utah 1987) , stated that findings ""should be sufficiently
detailed and includes enough subsidiary facts to disclose the
steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was
reached." Id. at 999 (quoting Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336,
1338 (Utah 1979)). In its findings, the court below must clearly
articulate the reasons for disregarding the Stipulation and
Settlement Agreement. The trial court fails in this regard.
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A. UTAH LAW ALLOWS AN ADJUSTMENT BASED UPON A SUBSTANTIAL
CHANGE TO THE PARTIES' CIRCUMSTANCES:
Utah law allows an adjustment to child support based upon a
substantial change to the parties' circumstances.

The relevant

statute reads as follows:
(7) (a) A parent, legal guardian, or the office may
at any time petition the court to adjust the amount of a
child support order if there has been a substantial
change in circumstances.
(b) For purposes of Subsection (7) (a) , a substantial
change in circumstances may include:
(i) material changes in custody;
(ii) material changes in the relative wealth or
assets of the parties;
(iii) material changes of 30% or more in the income
of a parent;
(iv) material changes in the ability of a parent to
earn;
(v) material changes in the medical needs of the
child; and
(vi) material changes in the legal responsibilities
of either parent for the support of others.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2 (7) (a)&(b) (1953 as amended).

If the

court finds such a change in the circumstances, it must "then
determine whether the change results in a difference of 15% or
more between the amount of child support ordered and the amount
that would be required under the guidelines.

If there is such a

difference and the difference is not of a temporary nature, the
court shall adjust the amount of child support ordered to that
which is provided for in the guidelines."
(7) (c) .
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Id. at § 78-45-7.2

B.

APPLICATION TO ERICH DIENER:

As set forth above, the Erich Diener's situation has
substantially changed.

At the time of the divorce, he was

employed full time in the military earning approximately
$1,700.00 gross per month (salary plus housing allowance).
Transcript, p. 17-18.

His current gross income from part-time

work at The Gateway Academy is approximat

y $1,032.00, monthly.

The difference, is a forty percent (40%) uecrease in Mr. Diener's
income.8
There are additional substantial changes to Mr. Diener's
circumstances, and his ability to earn.

Mr. Diener worked

briefly for Circuit City (Transcript, p. 18); he was employed by
TEKsystems (Transcript, p. 18-19); he was terminated from
TEKsystems as the result of a reduction in force (Transcript, p.
19) ; and he has been unsuccessful locating similar employment
without a college degree (Transcript, p. 19-21).

Mr. Diener

returned to college in pursuit of a Bachelor's Degree.
Transcript, p. 21 & 28.

As noted, he is currently employed by

The Gateway Academy, a residential treatment center for teenage
boys.

Transcript, p. 26.

He earns approximately $10.00 per hour

8

Including Mr. Diener's income from the Utah National
Guard translates to a 25% decrease in income.
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and works about 24 hours a week on the graveyard shift.
Transcript, p. 27.
The lower court made the following findings, comporting wi
Mr. Diener's testimony:
[Mr. Diener] was temporarily employed by Circuit
City, . . . making about $1,200.00.
[Mr. Diener] was employed by TEKsystems . . ., from
July 1998 through September 2001 . . . . [He lost said]
job because of the down-turn of the economy and the
computer technology industry.
[Mr. Diener] was unemployed
through November 2 001.

from September 20 01

[Mr. Diener] was employed at Tucci's restaurant from
November 2001 through October 2002, earning approximately
$1,560.00 per month, including tips.
*

*

*

[Mr. Diener] worked on contract for TEKsystems . .
. in 2002. He earned a total of $3,655.00 . . . .
[Mr. Diener] has provided technical computer
assistance and consulting to the Utah Legal Clinic in
trade for legal services . . . [totaling $1,200.00 in
2001 and $1,912.50 in 2002].
•

*

*

[Mr. Diener] enlisted in the Utah National Guard in
2002. [He] earns approximately $245.00 per month.
[Mr. Diener] began working part-time for Gateway
Academy . . . .
*
*
* [His] gross income is
approximately $1,032.00 per month . . . .
3/25/2003 Order, p / 3 - 4

(R. 204-205) (numbering omitted).

Finally, the court specifically found that Mr. Diener requires
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college degree "to again obtain gainful employment at a
reasonable rate of pay."

3/25/2003 Order, p. 4 (R. 205).

In spite of the evidence and the specific findings, the
court concluded that Erich Diener's "financial circumstances have
not changed substantially .. . ."
207).

3/25/2003 Order, p. 6 (R.

Such a conclusion is erroneous.

Erich Diener's financial

circumstances have changed substantially.

His ability to earn

has been substantially altered, and his earnings have
significantly decreased.
The court's erroneous conclusion may stem from Mr. Diener's
stipulation regarding the amount to be used for the child support
calculation.

Mr. Diener stipulated that the amount of $1,750.00

could be used for the purpose of calculating child support, if
the court found basis for modification.9

Transcript, p. 29.

The

purpose behind Mr. Diener's stipulation was to facilitate
settlement/resolution of this matter, and to benefit his child.
Erich Diener testified that he did not actually earn that amount.
Transcript, p. 29.

That amount represented what he would earn jLf

he were able to work full-time at The Gateway Academy.

9

By so stipulating, Mr. Diener did not waive his right to
claim a substantial change in circumstances. He should be
permitted to request modifications pursuant to §§ 78-457.2(6)&(7)(1953 as amended). Mr. Diener did not stipulate that
amount be used to determine whether there was a change in his
earnings.
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C.

APPLICATION TO TIFFANY DIENER:

The trial court erred in its narrow application of Utah Code
Ann. § 78-45-7.2(7) (1953 as amended) solely to Erich Diener's
financial circumstances and not the overall change in both
parties' circumstances.
both parties' lives.

There have been substantial changes in

Indeed, the lower court made specific

findings that should have resulted in a legal conclusion that
there are substantial changes in Tiffany Diener's circumstances.
The court found that Ms. Diener was employed as a nanny, earning
$1,192.00 plus room and board at the time of the divorce.
3/25/2003 Order, p. 5.

The court also found that Ms. Diener is

now unemployed and pursuing a college degree full time.
3/25/2003 Order, p. 5.

Nevertheless, the court failed to

conclude that there were substantial changes to Ms. Diener's
circumstances, and thus the parties' circumstances.
In light of the overall, substantial change in the parties'
circumstances, the lower court erred in failing to recalculate
child support pursuant to the guidelines.
IV. THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD CAN BE MET BY A REDUCTION OF
CHILD SUPPORT.
The court below found u no substantive evidence before the
Court that reducing the child support in this matter would be in
the best interests of the parties' minor child.
29

3/25/2003 Order,

p. 5 (R. 206). While most would agree that an increase of child
support would always be in the best interest of the child, this
Court must consider whether it would ever be in the best
interests of the child to decrease child support.

See generally

Transcript, p. 80-81 ("[C]an you conceive of a situation where
reducing someone's child support would be in the best interest of
the child?").
The plain reading of §§ 75-78-45-7.2(6)&(7) (1953 as
amended) shows that the legislature drafted the provisions with
the intention that modifications to child support could be
calculated to either increase or decrease.
is some friction in §§ 75-45-7.2(6)&(7).

Nevertheless, there
The first section

reads, in part, uUpon receiving a petition under Subsection
(6)(a), the court shall, taking into account the best interests
of the child, determine whether there is a difference between the
amount ordered and the amount that would be required under the
guidelines."

Utah Code Ann. § 75-45-7.2(6) (b) (1953 as amended) .

The second section reads, in part, "Upon receiving a petition
under Subsection (7)(a), the court shall, taking into account the
best interests of the child, determine whether a substantial
change has occurred."

Utah Code Ann. § 75-45-7.2(7) (c) (1953 as

amended).
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This appears to be an issue of first impression in Utah.
Thus, an examination of states with similar statutory provisions
is warranted.

Several states have incorporated the "best

interests of the child" standard into requirements for
modification.

See generally 16 J. Am. Acad. Matrimonial Law 259.

For example, in Kansas, a court may modify child support at any
time "as required by the best interests of the child." Kan.
Stat. Ann. § 38-1121 (c). In Nevada, one may request a review
every three (3) years.

The court, may modify child support if it

determines a modification is appropriate, while "taking into
account the best interests of the child . . . . " .

Nev. Rev.

Stat. § 125B.145.
Florida, however, appears to be the first state to have
specifically examined the meaning of the term "the best interests
of the child," and allowed modification purely on that basis.

In

Florida, a court may modify child support when adjustment is
found necessary "in the best interests of the child."

Florida

Stat. Ann. § 61.13(1)(a).
In Wood v. Wood, 272 So.2d 14 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973), the
District Court of Appeal of Florida recognized that the Florida
legislature had broadened the basis on which modification may be
awarded.

In Wood, an obligor father argued that an ordered

increase in child support was unfair because there had been no
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substantial change in the parties' circumstances.
rejected this argument.

Id. at 15.

Id.

The court

In so doing, the appellate

court affirmed the lower court's finding that modification was
appropriate when necessary for the best interests of the child.
Id.

The Wood court, thus, construed § 61.13 to provide two (2)

distinct basis to modify: 1) when necessary "for the best
interests of the child," and 2), "when . . . there has been a
substantial change in circumstances."

Id. at 14 n.l.

Two (2) decades later, the Florida judiciary discussed
whether a child support reduction could be in the best interests
of the child.

In Overby v. Overby, 698 So.2d 811 (Fl. 1997) the

obligor parent decided to attend law school, and sought to modify
child support.

Id. at 112.

The children were ten (10) and (16)

when the modification action was brought.

Id. at 115.

Based

upon these facts, the court found that the decision to attend law
school did not sustain decreased child support.

Id.

The Court

reasoned that the children would be too old when the obligor
graduated, and thus would not benefit from a potential increased
earnings.

Thus, the Overby court rejected the lower court's

finding that it was in the "best interests of the children" to
reduce child support.

Id.

Nevertheless, the Overby court addressed a broader issue of
reduction in child support.

The court recognized that a "need
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for retraining when a skill is no longer needed and the need for
increased education to enhance income [could be] important
factors that may be considered [in reducing child support]."

Id.

Prior to Overby, the analysis to reduce child support had
been whether a return to school, reduction in income, etc., was
voluntary or involuntary.

Id. at 814.

In Overby, however, the

Florida judiciary resolved that "the focus should be whether the
temporary reduction will be in the best interests of the
[child]. "10

Id.

The Overby court opined that a temporary

reduction would be permissible if the long term effect would
benefit the children.

Given the right facts, Florida courts will

find a reduction in child support is in the best interests of the
child if the minor child will ultimately benefit from the
intervening factors.l:L
Other jurisdictions, geographically closer to Utah, have not
entirely adopted Florida's analysis.

Arizona examines whether

the parent's decision to return to school is voluntary or as the
10

The court affirmed, "We . . . disapprove the [previous]
opinions . . .
to the extent they rely on a voluntary/
involuntary rather than best interests analysis to justify or
deny a requested reduction in child support payments." Overby,
698 So.2d at 815.
11

u

In light of today's fast paced changing age of technology, trial judges will have to evaluate, on a case by case
basis, whether a temporary reduction in child support payments
due to a payor's pursuit of an enhanced education will eventually
be legally beneficial to the recipients." Overby, 698 So.2d at
815.
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result of involuntary unemployment.
108, 111 (Ariz. 1999).

Little v. Little, 975 P. 2d

Nevertheless, Arizona has recognized the

importance of a temporary modification of a child support that
may lead to long term economic benefit for the child.
112.

Id. at

In Little, the Supreme Court of Arizona found a father was

not entitled to decreased child support when he voluntarily
resigned a commission in the Air Force to pursue a law degree.
Id. at 114.

The court reasoned: 1) there was no evidence the

father would earn more with a law degree, and 2) there was no
evidence the father attempted to obtain any employment to fulfill
his financial obligations.

Id.

Nevertheless, the court declined to adopt a strict test that
would only look "at the earning capacity of a party in fashioning
a support obligation."

Id. at 112 (citing Lewis Becker, Spousal

and Child Support and the "Voluntary Reduction of Income"
Doctrine, 29 Conn. L. Rev. 647, 658 (1997)).

Such a test allows

"no consideration of the parent's individual freedom or of the
economic benefits that can result to both parent and child from
additional training or education."

Id.

Where a parent's voluntary decision to terminate employment
and return to school does not place the children in peril, the
court must consider the overall reasonableness of the parent's
decision.

Id.

Given the right facts, Arizona will allow a child
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support reduction where a parent voluntarily changes employment
status to further education.
Idaho, adopts a more myopic test, simply looking at whether
the decrease in income was voluntary or involuntary.

Idaho has

declined to look toward long term benefits to the child.

In

Humberger v. Humberger, 995 P.2d 809 (Idaho 2000), the Supreme
Court of Idaho denied a wife's petition to reduce child support.
The court affirmed a lower court's finding that the wife was
voluntarily unemployed based on her decision to attend college.
Id. at 812.

The wife lost a job as a waitress, and could not

find sufficient employment to provide for herself and her two
children.
degree.

Id. at 811-812.
Id. at 812.

Thus, she decided to seek a college

The court did not consider the long term

economic benefits of improved education and instead ratified a
strict test as to whether the reduction in income was voluntary
or involuntary.

Id.

In application herein, Erich Diener is neither voluntarily
unemployed, nor voluntarily underemployed.

Indeed, the trial

court specifically found that Mr. Diener requires a college
degree "to again obtain gainful employment at a reasonable rate
of pay."

3/25/2003 Order, p. 4 (R. 205).

In determining the

best interests of the child, this Court should allow a reduction
in child support based upon the facts herein.
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This Court should

determine that an obligor's decision to return to school might
ultimately benefit the child, by adopting a long term view of
greater earning capacity.

In addition, involuntary unemployment

or underemployment should not weigh against the obligor.
V. AN INJUSTICE WILL BE PERPETRATED UPON MR. DIENER IF
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING IS ALLOWED TO STAND.
Tiffany Diener depleted her trust account prior to the
marriage.

She asserts, however, that Erich Diener assisted in

the depletion of that account.

Pursuant to the lower court's

ruling, Mr. Diener is ordered to pay a child support in excess of
the guidelines perhaps until the child reaches the age of
maj ority as *repayment."
Based upon the trial testimony, at best the court may have
found that Erich Diener depleted funds from Tiffany's trust in
the amounts of $5,000.00 for tuition/plane ticket, and $2,400.00
for the purchase of the truck.12

Tiffany Diener testified that

Erich Diener repaid $1,2 00.00 when he sold the truck.

Assuming

arguendo Ms. Diener's account to be accurate, the most debt she
proved at trial was $6,200.00, all incurred prior to the

The court made no such findings.
36

marriage.13

Nevertheless, the lower court's order forces Mr.

Diener to repay that debt several times over.
Simple math demonstrates this principle.
set at $400.00.

Child support is

Pursuant to the court's ruling, Mr. Diener can

never adjust that amount.

Pursuant to the Utah guidelines, and

based upon the parties' incomes, child support should be $234.00.
Thus, Erich Diener is paying $166.00 "extra" per month in child
support.

In roughly three (3) years, Erich will have "repaid"

Tiffany Diener the $6,200.00 that she asserted at trial (again,
assuming arguendo

that such debts existed prior to the marriage) .

After repayment, Tiffany Diener will be unjustly enriched by
continued, excessive child support.
supports such a scheme.
such a scheme.

No finding of the court

A court in equity should not support

An injustice will be perpetrated upon Mr. Diener

if the lower court's ruling is allowed to stand.

CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
The lower court erred in denying Erich Diener's request to
modify the decree to adjust child support.

Erich Diener is

entitled to an adjustment in child support pursuant to Utah law
after the passage of three (3) years.

13

Furthermore, Erich Diener

No finding could be made that Erich Diener depleted the
trust account during the marriage, because Tiffany Diener
testified the fund was gone prior to the marriage.
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is entitled to a modification based upon the substantial change
in the parties' circumstances.

Finally, the lower court erred in

finding a bargained-for exchange of alimony for increased child
support, particularly in light of the fact that no such evidence
of said bargain is found in the parties' original divorce papers.
The lower court should recalculate child support pursuant to
the guidelines, based upon the parties' income, and order Erich
Diener to pay the resulting amount.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2nd day of OCTOBER 2003.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT/APPELLANT
/

by

i/ Q^n

(/h

BRIAN
BARNAR:
JAMES 11. HARRIS, Jr.
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ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
These issues implicate important rights affecting noncustodial parents and their child support obligations.

One

particular issue appears to be one of first impression in the
State of Utah.

Appellant believes that oral argument will give

the parties a beneficial opportunity to explain their respective
positions and to answer questions from the Court.
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I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed four (4) true
and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANTS to:
JOHN W. CALL
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT, L.C.
Attorneys for APPELLEE
33 3 North 3 00 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
and
MADELYN M. IBARRA
TAMMY R. WEIS
BEVERLY A. BORTOLUSSI
CARLA M. FULLER
ORS Agents
STEPHANIE SAPERSTEIN
Attorney for Office of Recovery Services
P.O. BOX 45011
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0011
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States Postal Service.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for RESPONDENT/APPELLANT
/
/

by:
BRIAN if. BARNARD
JAMES L. HARRIS, JR.
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ATTACHMENT A
P e t i t i o n t o Modify (R. 4 3 ) .

BRIAN M. BARNARD
USB #0215
JAMES L. HARRIS, Jr.
USB # 8204
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Defendant
214 East Fifth South Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111-3204
Telephone: (801) 328-9531
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH

SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
TIFFANY JACOBS DIENER,
Plaintiff,

:
. :

vs.

:

ERICH ROSS DIENER,

:

Defendant.

PETITION
TO MODIFY DECREE

:

Case No. 98-490-1948 DA

(Hon. F. NOEL)

THE DEFENDANT, ERICH ROSS DIENER, by and through counsel,
Brian M. Barnard makes this Petition Seeking to Modify the Decree
of Divorce entered herein and in support of that petition states
as follows:

1.

The parties were divorced and a decree entered herein on

April 17, 1998.
2.

The decree awarded to plaintiff child support for the

one minor child of the parties at the rate of four hundred
dollars ($400.00) per month.

3.

Since the entry of the decree, there has been a

substantial change in the circumstances of both parties.
plaintiff is now unemployed and a full time student.

The

The

defendant was laid from his employment at Teksystems, an
information technology and computer consulting firm.

Defendant

has been unable to find a comparable job at comparable pay.

The

defendant has taken a full time evening job anticipating that he
will attend the University of Utah on a full-time basis beginning
in January 2002 to earn a Bachelors of Science degree.

A degree

is necessary for defendant to re-gain comparable employment in
the computer industry.

He believes that it will take him two (2)

years to complete the requirements for that degree.
4.

Defendant's current monthly income is $1,560.00 per

month including tips.
per month.

Plaintiff's current monthly income is - 0 -

Based upon the foregoing, defendant's monthly child

support obligation should be two hundred thirty-four dollars
($234.00) per month and plaintiff's monthly child support
obligation should be - 0 - per month.
5.

The decree required defendant to maintain life insurance

on his life of $200,000.00.

In light of his change in jobs such

insurance is no longer available to defendant.

The decree should

be modified to require maintenance of such insurance only as
available through a parties' employer.
6.

The decree required the creation and maintenance of a

college fund for the child.

Neither party has done so.

In light

of the current circumstances of the parties, the requirement to
create and maintain such a fund should be suspended.
7.

The decree of divorce provides that the plaintiff shall

be allowed to claim the minor child as a dependent for income tax
purposes.

In light of the other modifications as set forth

above, the parties should be allowed to claim the child on their
respective tax returns in alternating years:

plaintiff for even

numbered tax years and defendant for odd numbered tax years.

For

the years in which plaintiff is so allowed to claim the child,
the defendant should be allowed to "purchase" that right from
plaintiff.

To do so, on or before March 15th of the year in

which the tax return is due, plaintiff would calculate her taxes
for the applicable tax year in two ways:

first with claiming the

child and the second time with her not claiming the child.
Within ten (10) days of receipt of those two (2) tax returns,
defendant would be allowed to purchase from the plaintiff the
right to claim the child for that tax year, by payment of the
amount plaintiff would "lose" by not claiming the child.

Upon

receipt of that payment, plaintiff would execute and deliver to
the defendant, the necessary tax form to allow defendant to so
claim the child.
8.

The decree of divorce should be modified and amended to

recalculate defendant's child support obligations, etc. in light

of the substantial change of circumstances of both parties.

WHEREFORE, the decree of divorce should be modified as set
forth above.
Dated this 3rd day of DECEMBER 2001.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for DEFENDANT

ERICH ROSS DIENE1T

VERIFICATION AND ACKNOWLEDGMENT
STATE OF UTAH
SS
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
THE ABOVE NAMED PARTY, ERICH DIENER, personally appeared
before me, a notary public, on the date above written, and having
been duly sworn upon oath acknowledged to me that he was the
person that had executed that above and foregoing document,
having read and understood it, and knowing the contents thereof,
swearing that the contents are true, and having voluntarily
subscribed his name thereto intending to be bound there
Notary Public

"1

slftWfeWBIiWi:.
214 East axfsouth
I
^ f ^ 0 * * Utah 84111-3204 .
My CommJMtan Hxpta*
I
f
October^ 2005
mm

^ S t a t e of Utah

1

^bfefTARY PTJB
S t a t e of

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing PETITION FOR MODIFICATION to:
TIFFANY JACOBS DIENER
Plaintiff PRO SE
1464 University Village
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108
on the 3RD day of DECEMBER 2001, postage prepaid in the United
States Postal Service.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Defendant

C:\Domestic\DIENERraod PET.wpd/BMB
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ATTACHMENT B
F i n d i n g s of F a c t , C o n c l u s i o n s of Law
and Order (R. 202) .

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District
MAR 2 5 2003
JOHN W. CALL, USB #0542
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT, L.C.
Attorneys for Petitioner Tiffany
Jacobs Diener
333 North 300 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Telephone: (801) 328-2506
Facsimile: (801) 364-6403

°v^p

ALT LAKE COUNTY
Deputy Cierk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

TIFFANY JACOBS DIENER,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND ORDER

Petitioner,

Civil No. 984901948 DA
ERICH ROSS DIENER,
Respondent.

Honorable Frank G. Noel
Commissioner Michael Evans

Defendant Erich Ross Diener's Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce came on for trial
on February 6,2003 before the Honorable Frank G. Noel, District Judge presiding. Petitioner
was present and represented by his attorney, Brian M. Barnard. The Respondent, Tiffany
Jacobs Diener, was present and represented by her attorney, John W. Call. Each of the parties
had submitted a trial memorandum prior to trial which memoranda were reviewed by the
Court. The Court heard argument and the testimony of the parties. Therefore, being thus
duly advised in the premises, the Court hereby makes and enters the following

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Prior to Ms. Diener's filing of the Petition for Divorce in this matter, she and Mr.

Diener agreed that the Mr. Diener would pay child support in the amount of $400, which both
parties knew was higher than the child support guidelines.
2.

The higher child support amount was a bargained-for consideration where each

of the parties made significant concessions in reaching that agreement. Ms. Diener agreed not
to pursue claims for alimony or additional property settlement, based upon Mr. Diener's use
of Ms. Dienerrs pre-marital assets, and Mr. Diener agreed to pay a higher monthly child
support amount in order to be relieved of the risk of such claims by Ms. Diener being
successful.
3.

The parties were divorced and a Decree entered herein by stipulation on April

17,1998. More than three (3) years have elapsed since entry of the decree. The Court takes
judicial notice of the parties' settlement stipulation filed herein and dated March 23,1998.
4.

Paragraph 3 of the Decree awarded to Plaintiff child support for the one minor

child of the parties at the rate of four hundred dollars ($400.00) per month. The child support
awarded in the original decree exceeded the Utah Child Support Guidelines.
5.

Although Mr. Diener earned as much as $55,000.00 annually since the divorce

was granted, Mr. Diener agreed that his present income may be imputed to be $1,750 per
month for the purposes of child support, slightly greater than the $1,700 per month income
he was receiving at the time of the parties' divorce.
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6.

Defendant was temporarily employed by Circuit City as a computer sales person

making about $1,200.00 gross per month from April 1998 through June 1998.
7.

Defendant was employed by TEKsystems, an information technology and

computer consulting firm, from June 1998 through September 2001. Defendant was hired at
$12.00 per hour. In September 2001, a reduction in force occurred and the Defendant was laid
off. The Defendant's salary at that time was $55,000.00 annually. He lost that job because of
the down-turn of the economy and the computer technology industry.
8.

Defendant was unemployed from September 2001 through November 2001.

9.

Despite searching, Defendant has been unable to find employment with income

comparable to TEKsystems.
10.

Defendant was employed by Tucci's restaurant from November 2001 through

October 2002 earning approximately $1,560.00 per month including tips. Defendant was hired
as a part-time bartender earning $7.25 per hour plus tips (income averaged to be $10.00 per
hour). The Defendant worked approximately 15 hours per week. Defendant also tried to pick
up additional hours (15-20 hours per week) as a server at which he earned a similar hourly
rate. Defendant took this job because it allowed him to attend the University of Utah during
the day.
11.

Defendant worked on contract for TEKsystems for approximately 20 hours a

week for a few months in 2002. He earned a total of $ 3,655.00 from TEKsystems in 2002. On
a part-time basis, he helped with the installation of a computer system.

^t>M

12.

Defendant has provided technical computer assistance and consulting to Utah

Legal Clinic in trade for legal services in representing Defendant in this action. Credit has
been given at the rate of twenty-five dollars ($25.00) per hour for work performed. For the
year 2001, as an independent contractor, Defendant provided a total of $1,200.00 in services
to Utah Legal Clinic. For the year 2002, Defendant provided a total of $1,912.50 in services
to Utah Legal Clinic. Internal Revenue Service form 1099fs have been provided to Defendant
by Utah Legal Clinic in those amounts for those years.
13.

Defendant enlisted with the Utah National Guard in 2002. His work obligation

is one (1) weekend per month. Defendant earns approximately $245.00 gross per month from
the guard.
14.

Defendant began working part-time for Gateway Academy on January 26,2003

as a Milieu Manager. He supervises teenagers in a residential facility. The Defendant is
working approximately 24 hours per week and is working the graveyard shift. The Defendant
is earning $10.00 per hour. The Defendant's gross income is approximately $1,032.00 per
month ($10.00 x 24 hrs. x 4.3 weeks = $1,032.00). Defendant has no benefits, no insurance, etc.
from that employment.
15.

Defendant is and has been a full time student at the University of Utah since

January 2002 working towards a Bachelors degree. A degree is necessary for Defendant to
again obtain gainful employment at a reasonable rate of income. The current plan is that he
will complete his degree in the Spring of 2004.
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16.

Ms. Diener is now unemployed and a full time University of Utah student and

currently earns no income. Plaintiff is capable of employment. Her plan is to complete her
degree in approximately two (2) years. The parties' child, Zoe is in elementary school and
attends school for a full school day.
17.

Ms. Diener was earning $1,192.00 per month and receiving free room and board

for herself and her daughter for work as a nanny when the divorce Decree was entered.
18.

There is no substantive evidence before the Court that reducing the child

support in this matter would be in the best interest of the parties' minor child.
19.

Since the Decree of Divorce was entered, the parties have made little

contribution to a college fund for the parties' minor child.
WHEREFORE, having made the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and
enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Because the parties made concessions and bargained for a higher child support

amount prior to the divorce, and because Mr. Dienerfs imputed income is slightly greater than
his income at the time the divorce was granted, it would be inequitable to apply the provisions
of § 78-45-7.2(6), Utah Code, to reduce Mr. Diener's child support obligation, inasmuch as
doing so would provide Mr. Diener with the benefits of the bargain without requiring its
corresponding obligations.

2.

Because the Defendant's financial circumstances have not changed substantially,

the Court finds that there is no substantial change in circumstances upon which to justify
modification of the child support Order under § 78-45-7.2(7), Utah Code.
3.

There are insufficient changes in the parties' relative income earning ability to

justify permitting Mr. Diener to claim the parties' minor child as a dependent for tax
deduction purposes in alternating years. However, it would be equitable, and Ms. Diener has
agreed, to modify the Decree to allow Mr. Diener to purchase the right from Ms. Diener the
right to the child's dependent tax deduction in each tax year that he wishes to do so by first
paying to Ms. Diener sufficient funds to compensate her for any greater tax burden as a result
of her not being able to use the tax deduction in that year.
4.

The Court finds that it would be equitable to modify the Decree that the parties

be required to obtain life insurance coverage for their lives for the benefit of the parties' minor
child, but only if it is available from their employers at reasonable cost.
5.

The Court finds that it would be equitable to modify the Decree to suspend the

provision in the Decree of Divorce that requires a 5% contribution of the parties' income to
a college fund for the benefit of the parties' minor child.
6.

The Court finds that it would be fair and equitable that each of the parties be

required to bear their own attorneys' fees and costs incurred in this matter.
WHEREFORE, the Court, having made and entered the foregoing Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, hereby orders as follows:
-6-

1.

Mr. Diener's Petition to Modify the child support provisions of Paragraph 3 of

the Decree of Divorce is hereby denied.
2.

Mr. Diener's Petition to Modify the tax deduction provisions of Paragraph 14

of the Decree of Divorce is denied as to his request regarding alternating years. However, it
is hereby ordered that Paragraph 14 is modified to allow Mr. Diener to purchase the right to
take the tax deduction in each tax year that he wishes to do so by first paying to Ms. Diener
the sufficient funds to compensate her for any greater tax burden as a result of her not being
able to use the tax deduction in that year.
3.

Mr. Diener's Petition to Modify the Decree in order to suspend the requirement

in Paragraph 7 that the parties contribute a percentage of their income to a college fund
account is hereby granted.
4.

Mr. Dienerfs Petition to Modify Paragraph 5 of the Decree regarding the

maintenance of life insurance coverage is hereby granted. Each party is now required to
obtain such life insurance, for the purposes and in the amounts stated in Paragraph 5 of the
Decree, only if it is available from the parties' employers at a reasonable cost.
5.

Each party is to bear their own costs and attorneys' fees incurred herein.

-7-
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/

DATED this I/O

Aj/

day of

/ W / f r l A . , 2003.
BY THE COURT

(V^
AA;

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order this y7* day of March, 2003, by U. S. Mail,
postage prepaid, to the following:
Brian M. Barnard
James L. Harris, Jr.
Utah Legal Clinic
Attorneys for Respondent Erich Ross Diener
214 East Fifth South Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2304
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ATTACHMENT C
D e c r e e of D i v o r c e

(R.

33).

hird Judicial District

APR 1 7 1998
Marilynn Burningham (#4571)
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C.
60 East South Temple, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1900
Attorneys for Petitioner

T LAKE COUNTY ~
SALT

-

By Deputy Clerk
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
TIFFANY JACOBS DIENER,
Petitioner,

DECREE OF DIVORCE
Civil No. 984901948DA

vs.

Judge Frank Noel

ERIC ROSS DIENER,
Respondent.

The parties have entered into a Stipulation providing that Eric's default be entered and
Tiffany awarded a Decree of Divorce pursuant to its terms. The Court has entered Eric's default,
reviewed the records, files and papers in this matter and received the testimony of Tiffany as to
jurisdiction and grounds.

Having received Tiffany's testimony that the Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce conform to the parties' Stipulation, and having entered
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court now
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows:
1.

The bonds of matrimony between the parties are dissolved, and Tiffany is* awarded

a Decree of Divorce from Eric to become final upon entry by the Court.

78859.DI210.001
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2.

Tiffany and Eric are awarded joint legal custody of the parties' minor child, Zoe-

Nicene, born February 19, 1995. Tiffany is awarded physical custody of the child, and Eric is
awarded liberal rights of visitation. In addition:
(a)

It is ordered that the parties exchange information concerning the health,

education and welfare of the child, and where possible, confer before making decisions
concerning any of these areas.
(b)

It is ordered that each party have direct access to all school reports and

medical records and be notified immediately by the other party in the event of a medical
emergency.
(c)

It is ordered that each party provide the other with a current address and

telephone number within 24 hours of any change.
(d)

It is ordered that each party permit and encourage liberal telephone contact

during reasonable hours.
3.

Tiffany is awarded child support in the amount of $400.00 per month, to be paid each

month until Zoe attains the age of 18 years or graduates from high school, whichever occurs last.
The child support exceeds that of the Utah Child Support Guidelines, as computed from Eric's
income of $1,700.00 per month and Tiffany's income of $1,192.00 per month.
4.

Petitioner is ordered to obtain and maintain health, dental and accident insurance for

the benefit of the parties' minor child. The parties are ordered to share equally all out-of-pocket
costs for insurance premiums, deductibles, co-payments, and any medical and dental costs for the
minor child which are not covered by insurance. It is ordered that the party who incurs medical and

78859 DI210 001
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dental expenses for the benefit of the minor child provide to the other written verification of the
expense incurred within 30 days. The receiving party is ordered to make payment of one-half the
expense incurred within 30 days of receipt of notification that the expense has been incurred.
5.

The parties are each ordered to maintain a life insurance policy for the benefit of the

minor child in the face amount of $200,000.00 for Respondent and $100,000.00 for Petitioner. Each
party is ordered to provide verification that the policy is in force, upon request of the other. It is
ordered that, until the parties' minor child reaches the age of 18 years, each party designate the other
as beneficiary on said life insurance policy, as trustee for the minor child.
6.

The parties agree that the primary and secondary school education of their daughter

is of paramount importance to each of them. Thus, it is ordered that extra costs incurred for
extracurricular activities or enrichment programs be shared equally.
7.

It is ordered that, each year until Zoe-Nicene reaches the age of 18 years, each party

contribute five percent (5%) of that party's gross annual income to an account to be used for Zoe's
post-secondary educational expenses. It is ordered that these annual contributions not be withdrawn
or disbursed until the parties and Zoe agree.
8.

The parties are able-bodied and able to provide for their own support, and it is ordered

that neither party pay alimony to the other.
9.

It is ordered that each party be responsible to maintain that party's medical and dental

insurance coverage, and that each be responsible for that party's uninsured medical and dental costs.

78859.DI210.001
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10.

The parties have divided the personal property acquired during the marriage in an

equitable fashion, and each party is awarded the personal property currently in that party's
possession.
11.

Each party is awarded that party's checking and savings accounts and such retirement

or other assets as have been accumulated in that party's name.
12.

Each party is ordered to assume and pay all debts and obligations incurred by that

party since their separation on November 24,1997, and to hold the other harmless from any liability
thereon. In addition, it is ordered that Petitioner assume and pay the following:
R.C. Willey
Nordstrom Account
Discover Card
Citibank Card
AAFES

$ 200.00
$1,900.00
$ 500.00
$ 750.00

It is ordered that Respondent assume and pay the following:

13.

Overdraft, America First
Computer Loan
Visa Card
AAFES

$ 500.00
$3,000.00
$3,500.00
$ 750.00

Nordstrom Account

$ 300.00

The parties have acquired two vehicles, subject to the balance due on the financing

loan from Weber State Credit Union: Petitioner's 1995 Passat and Respondent's 1994 Toyota truck.
Each party is ordered to obtain financing on the vehicle on which that party is the sole obligor. It
is ordered that the parties obtain separate financing within 21 days of the signing of this Agreement
and the Weber State Credit Union loan, which currently has a balance of approximately $30,000.00,
be paid in full.

78859.DI210.001
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14.

It is ordered that Petitioner be entitled to claim the minor child as an exemption for

federal and state income tax purposes.
15.

Respondent is ordered to assume and pay any additional tax liability arising from

transactions occurring or returns filed jointly by the parties during the marriage.
16.

The parties are ordered to execute such documents as may be necessary to transfer

the property as awarded by the Court to the party entitled thereto.
17.

Each party is ordered to pay the attorney fees and costs incurred by that party.

DATED this / (

day of

/Wrp^AN

, 1998.

BY THE COURT:

78859 DI210 001
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this , 3 / ^ d a y of March, 1998,1 did cause a true and correct
copy of the foregoing DECREE to be mailed, United States mails, postage prepaid, addressed to the
following:
Eric Ross Diener
9828 Emory Road
Fort Mead, Maryland 70755

'TMJ&AAMMA^^
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ATTACHMENT D
S t i p u l a t i o n and Settlement Agreement (R. 10).

Marilynn Burningham (#4571)
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C.
60 East South Temple, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1900
Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
TIFFANY JACOBS DIENER,
Petitioner,
vs.
ERIC ROSS DTENER,
Respondent.

;
)
])
]
)
]
)
]

STIPULATION AND
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

Civil No. 984901948DA
Judge Frank Noel

Come now the parties and make the following stipulations and agreements for the purpose
of settlement of this action and respectfully move the Court to adopt the stipulations and agreements
in the final decree of divorce to be entered herein:
DIVORCE
1.

Petitioner shall proceed to obtain a decree of divorce from Respondent dissolving the

marriage of the parties on the grounds of their irreconcilable differences, to become final upon entry
by the Court.
2.

Respondent has executed an Acceptance of Service and consents that his default may

be entered pursuant to the terms of this Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement and that this
matter may proceed at a time convenient to the Court and counsel.

78551 FI588 010
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3.

Petitioner is a bona fide and actual resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and

has been a resident for more than three months prior to the commencement of this action.
4.

Petitioner and Respondent and wife and husband, respectively, having been legally

married on July 2, 1994, in Layton, Davis County, State of Utah.
5.

Disagreements have ensued between the parties concerning their marriage and their

future together; meaningful communication between the parties has ceased; and, notwithstanding
attempts by the parties to reconcile and resolve their differences, continuation of the marriage under
the circumstances has become impossible.
CUSTODY.
6.

The parties have one minor child born as issue of their marriage: Zoe-Nicene Lois

Diener, born February 19,1995, age 3 years.
7.

This Court has jurisdiction to enter an order of custody pursuant to the Uniform Child

Custody Jurisdiction Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3(l)(b) (1987).
8.

The parties are fit and proper persons to have joint legal custody of the minor child.

Petitioner shall be the primary physical custodial of the child, subject to Respondent's liberal
visitation. In addition:
(a)

The parties shall exchange information concerning the health, education and

welfare of the child, and where possible, confer before making decisions concerning any of
these areas.
(b)

Each party shall have direct access to all school reports and medical records

and shall be notified immediately by the other party in the event of a medical emergency.

78551.FI588.010
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(c)

Each party shall provide the other with a current address and telephone

number within 24 hours of any change.
(d)

Each party shall permit and encourage liberal telephone contact during

reasonable hours.
CHILD SUPPORT AND RELATED PROVISIONS.
9.

/

.Ac±

Petitioneris currently employed earning $14,300.00 per year, or $1,192.00 per month, joqetrl&Y'

Respondent is currently serving in the Armed Forces earning $20,400.00 per year, or $ 1,700.00 per

^

month, together with an allowance for housing and other benefits.
10.

The parties agree that Respondent shall pay to Petitioner the sum of $400.00 as base

child support, to be paid each month until Zoe-Nicene attains the age of 18 years or graduates from
high school, whicheverjaccurs last.
f 1.

Respondent shall obtain and maintain health, dental and accident insurance for the

benefit of the parties' minor child. The parties shall share equally all out-of-pocket costs for
insurance premiums, deductibles, co-payments, and any medical and dental costs for the minor child
which are not covered by insurance. The party who incurs medical and dental expenses for the
benefit of the minor child shall provide to the other written verification of the expense incurred
within 30 days. The receiving party shall make payment of one-half the expense incurred within 30
days of receipt of notification that the expense has been incurred.
12.

The parties shall each maintain a life insurance policy for the benefit of the minor

child in the face amount of $200,000.00 for Respondent and $100,000.00 for Petitioner. Each party
shall provide verification that the policy is in force, upon request of the other. Until the parties'
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minor child reaches the age of 18 years, each party shall designate the other as beneficiary on said
life insurance policy, as trustee for the minor child.
13.

The parties agree that the primary and secondary school education of their daughter

is of paramount importance to each of them. Thus, the parties agree that extra costs incurred for
extracurricular activities or enrichment programs will be shared equally.
14.

The parties agree that, each year until Zoe-Nicene reaches the age of 18 years, each

party will contribute five percent (5%) of that party's gross annual income to an account to be used
for Zoe's post-secondary educational expenses. The parties agree that these annual contributions
shall not be withdrawn or disbursed until the parties and Zoe agree.
ALIMONY AND RELATED PROVISIONS.
15.

This is a brief marriage of 3-1/2 years duration. The parties are able-bodied and able

to provide for their own support and neither shall pay alimony to the other.
16.

Each party shall be responsible to maintain that party's medical and dental insurance

coverage, and each shall be responsible for that party's uninsured medical and dental costs.
PROPERTY AND DEBT DISTRIBUTION.
17.

The parties have divided the personal property acquired during the marriage in an

equitable fashion and each party is awarded the personal property currently in that party's possession.
18.

Each party shall be awarded that party's checking and savings accounts, and such

retirement or other assets as have been accumulated in that party's name.
19.

Each party shall assume and pay all debts and obligations incurred by that party since

their separation on November 24, 1997, and hold the other harmless from any liability thereon. In
addition, Petitioner shall assume and pay the following:
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R.C. Willey
Nordstrom Account
Discover Card
Citibank Card

$ 200.00
$1,900.00
$ 500.00

AAFES

$ 750.00

Respondent shall assume and pay the following:

20.

Computer Loan
Visa Card
AAFES

$3,000.00 ' '
$3,500.00
$ 750.00

Nordstrom Account

$ 300.00

The parties have acquired two vehicles, subject to the balance due on the financing

loan from Weber State Credit Union: Petitioner's 1995 Passat and Respondent's 1994 Toyota truck.
The parties agree that each will obtain financing on which that party is the sole obligor. The parties
agree to obtain separate financing within 21 days of the signing of this Agreement and the Weber
State Credit Union loan, which currently has a balance of approximately $30,000.00, shall be paid
in full.
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS.
21.

Petitioner shall be entitled to claim the minor child as an exemption for federal and

state income tax purposes.
22.

Respondent agrees to assume and pay any additional tax liability arising from

transactions occurring or returns filed jointly by the parties during the marriage.
23.

Each party shall assume and pay the attorney fees and costs incurred by each in this

24.

The parties shall execute such documents as may be necessary to transfer the property

action.

as awarded by the Court to the party entitled thereto.
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2 5.

The parties have folly and accurately disclosed in this Agreement all real and personal

property in which they have an interest, all debts for which they are liable and their incomes. The
parties also represent that they have made no transfer or distribution of any funds or property to any
third party except in the course of typical and reasonable living and business expenses.
26.

The parties represent that, prior to the execution of this Agreement, they reviewed

and discussed its terms with their respective counsel, as deemed necessary, and that they believe the
Agreement is a fair and equitable distribution of the assets acquired and liabilities incurred by the
parties.
DATED this

of March, 1998.

On this J(3
day of March, 1998, personally appeared before me TIFFANY JACOBS
DIENER, who, after being duly swom and upon her oath, deposes and states that she has read the
foregoing Agreement, knows and understands its contents, and states that the same is true to the best
of her knowledge and that she executes this document as a free and voluntary act for its stated
purpose.

NOTARY PUBLIC
ANITA MAJOR
60 East South Temple #1100

$4u£&
Notary Public

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

My Commission Expires
February 2i, 1999

STATE OF UTAH
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DATED this^l

day of March, 1998.

Eric Ross Diener
On this ZZ day of March, 1998, personally appeared before me ERIC ROSS DIENER,
who, after being duly sworn and upon his oath, deposes and states that he has read the foregoing
Agreement, knows and understands its contents, and states that the same is true to the best of his
knowledge and that he executes this document as afreeand voluntary act for its stated purpose.

NOTARY PUBLIC
BOYD F.BUTLER
3333 So. 900 E. #100
S.LC., UT 84106
COMMISSION EXPIRES
MAY 10,2001
STATE OF UTAH
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ATTACHMENT E
Original Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law (R. 26) .
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60 East South Temple, Suite 1100
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Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
TIFFANY JACOBS DIENER,
Petitioner,

FINDINGS OF FACT
AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
Civil No. 984901948DA
ERIC ROSS DIENER,
Judge Frank Noel
Respondent.
The parties to this action, Petitioner Tiffany Jacobs Diener ("Tiffany") and Respondent Eric
Ross Diener ("Eric"), have entered into a Stipulation providing that Eric's default be entered and
Tiffany awarded a Decree of Divorce pursuant to the terms of the Stipulation. The Court has
reviewed the records and papers on file and has received, by affidavit, the testimony of Tiffany as
to jurisdiction and grounds and that the proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree
of Divorce conform to the Stipulation of the parties. Being fully advised in the premises, the Court
enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Tiffany is a bona fide and actual resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and has

been such for more than three months prior to the commencement of this action.
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2.

Tiffany and Eric are wife and husband, having been married on July 2, 1994, in

Layton, Davis County, State of Utah.
3.

Disagreements have ensued between the parties concerning their marriage and their

future together; meaningful communication between the parties has ceased; notwithstanding attempts
by the parties to reconcile and resolve their differences, the same have been unsuccessful; and, the
disagreements have become irreconcilable, making continuation of the marriage under the
circumstances impossible.
4.

One child has been born as issue of the marriage, namely, Zoe-Nicene Lois, bom

February 19, 1995.
5.

This Court has jurisdiction to enter an order of custody pursuant to the Uniform Child

Custody Jurisdiction Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3(l)(b) (1987).
6.

Both parties are fit and proper persons to have the care, custody and control of Zoe-

Nicene, and it is fair and reasonable that they be awarded joint legal custody. Tiffany should be the
primary physical custodian of the child, subject to Eric's liberal rights of visitation. In addition:
(a)

It is fair and reasonable that the parties exchange information concerning the

health, education and welfare of the child, and where possible, confer before making
decisions concerning any of these areas.
(b)

It is fair and reasonable that each party have direct access to all school reports

and medical records and be notified immediately by the other party in the event of a medical
emergency.
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(c)

It is fair and reasonable that each party provide the other with a current

address and telephone number within 24 hours of any change.
(d)

It is fair and reasonable that each party permit and encourage liberal telephone

contact during reasonable hours.
7.

Pursuant to the Stipulation of the parties, it is fair and reasonable that Tiffany be

awarded child support in the amount of $400.00 per month, to be paid each month until Zoe reaches
the age of 18 years or graduates from high school, whichever occurs last. The child support exceeds
that of the child support guidelines, as computed jfrom Eric's income of $1,700.00 per month and
Tiffany's income of $1,192.00 per month.
8.

It is fair and reasonable that Petitioner obtain and maintain health, dental and accident

insurance for the benefit of the parties' minor child. It is fair and reasonable that the parties share
equally all out-of-pocket costs for insurance premiums, deductibles, co-payments, and any medical
and dental costs for the minor child which are not covered by insurance. It is fair and reasonable that
the party who incurs medical and dental expenses for the benefit of the minor child provide to the
other written verification of the expense incurred within 30 days. It is fair and reasonable that the
receiving party make payment of one-half the expense incurred within 30 days of receipt of
notification that the expense has been incurred.
9.

It is fair and reasonable that the parties each maintain a life insurance policy for the

benefit of the minor child in the face amount of $200,000.00 for Respondent and $100,000.00 for
Petitioner. It is fair and reasonable that each party provide verification that the policy is in force,
upon request of the other. It is fair and reasonable that, until the parties' minor child reaches the age
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of 18 years, each party designate the other as beneficiary on said life insurance policy, as trustee for
the minor child.
10.

The parties have agreed that the primary and secondary school education of their

daughter is of paramount importance to each of them. Thus, it is fair and reasonable that extra costs
incurred for extracurricular activities or enrichment programs be shared equally.
11.

Pursuant to the Stipulation of the parties, it is fair and reasonable that, each year until

Zoe-Nicene reaches the age of 18 years, each party contribute five percent (5%) of that party's gross
annual income to an account to be used for Zoe's post-secondary educational expenses. It is fair and
reasonable that these annual contributions not be withdrawn or disbursed until the parties and Zoe
agree,
12.

The parties are able-bodied and able to provide for their own support, and it is fair

and reasonable that neither party pay alimony to the other.
13.

It is fair and reasonable that each party be responsible to maintain that party's medical

and dental insurance coverage, and that each be responsible for that party's uninsured medical and
dental costs.
14.

The parties have divided the personal property acquired during the marriage in an

equitable fashion, and it is fair and reasonable that each party be awarded the personal property
currently in that party's possession.
15.

It is fair and reasonable that each party be awarded that party's checking and savings

accounts and such retirement or other assets as have been accumulated in that party's name.
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16.

It is fair and reasonable that each party assume and pay all debts and obligations

incurred by that party since their separation on November 24, 1997, and hold the other harmless
from any liability thereon. In addition, it is fair and reasonable that Petitioner assume and pay the
following:
R.C. Willey
Nordstrom Account
Discover Card
Citibank Card
AAFES

$ 200.00
$1,900.00
$ 500.00
$ 750.00

It is fair and reasonable that Respondent assume and pay the following:

17.

Overdraft, America First
Computer Loan
Visa Card
AAFES

$ 500.00
$3,000.00
$3,500.00
$ 750.00

Nordstrom Account

$ 300.00

The parties have acquired two vehicles, subject to the balance due on the financing

loan from Weber State Credit Union: Petitioner's 1995 Passat and Respondent's 1994 Toyota truck.
It is fair and reasonable that each party obtain financing on the vehicle on which that party is the sole
obligor. It is fair and reasonable that the parties obtain separate financing within 21 days of the
signing of this Agreement and the Weber State Credit Union loan, which currently has a balance of
approximately $30,000.00, be paid in fall.
18.

It is fair and reasonable that Petitioner be entitled to claim the minor child as an

exemption for federal and state income tax purposes.
19.

It is fair and reasonable that Respondent assume and pay any additional tax liability

arising from transactions occurring or returns filed jointly by the parties during the marriage.
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20.

It is fair and reasonable that the parties execute such documents as may be necessary

to transfer the property as awarded by the Court to the party entitled thereto.
21.

It is fair and reasonable that each party pay the attorney fees and costs incurred by

that party.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

This Court has jurisdiction over the parties in this matter, and Tiffany is entitled to

a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences.
2.

A Decree of Divorce shall be entered, consistent with the foregoing Findings of Fact.

DATED this / (

day of

/V^^r>^X^
BY THE COURT:
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1998.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this , ? r f day of March, 1998,1 did cause a true and correct
copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to be mailed, United
States mails, postage prepaid, addressed to the followmg:
Eric Ross Diener
9828 Emory Road
Fort Mead, Maryland 70755
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